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Abstract
Two of Jhering’s ideas are crucial to understanding the problems besetting the merger of East
and West Germany. They are (a) the centrality of the notion of private property as the foundation,
not only of property rights, but of personal rights as well; and (b) his notion of rechtsgefu¨hl,
translated clumsily as a feeling of legal right, but implying the pain and irritation a person feels
when he has been put upon. [FN8] It is my thesis that a fundamental difference between the
way these two concepts are viewed in the former East and West Germanies is a sword in the bed,
presenting a fierce obstacle to the union that both desire.
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INTRODUCTION
In the first decade of this century a man named William
Morningstar was a guest in the Lafayette Hotel in Buffalo, New
York. Wearying of hotel cuisine, he went out and bought some
spare ribs, which the hotel chef then cooked to Morningstar's
pleasure. Not so much to his satisfaction, however, was a bill for
$1 for the chef's services, which Morningstar thought exorbitant.
Because of his obstinate refusal to pay the dollar, Morningstar
was denied further service in the hotel dining room; and the
headwaiter made sure that he announced this in full throat for
the entire hotel to hear. Morningstar sued the hotel for slander.
The case wended its way to the New York Court of Appeals
where the principal issue was whether evidence was admissible
that in the hotel community Morningstar was a well-known
"kicker," a person disposed to grumble and find endless fault. In
an opinion' by Judge Benjamin Cardozo, perhaps the greatest
judge ever to grace the New York Court of Appeals, an unani-
mous court held that evidence of the plaintiffs sour disposition
should not have been admitted before the jury.2
True, the controversy that spawned the suit was trivial. But
this was not a concern of the Court for, as Cardozo observed,
" [t] o enforce one's rights when they are violated is never a legal
wrong, and may often be a moral duty."3 Continuing, Cardozo
wrote, "A greatjurist, Rudolf von [J] hering, in his Struggle for Law,
ascribes the development of law itself to the persistence in
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Adjunct Profes-
sor, St. John's University School of Law. Former Dean, Fordham University School of
Law. I wish to acknowledge the invaluable research assistance of Simon Roosevelt,
Fordham University School of Law, Class of 1994. This article is based upon a lecture
delivered at the Fall Meeting of the International Law and Practice Section of the N.Y.
State Bar Association, held in Berlin, Germany, October 6-10, 1993.
1. Morningstar v. Lafayette Hotel Co., 211 N.Y. 465, 105 N.E. 656 (1914).
2. Id at 468, 105 N.E. 657.
3. Id,
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human nature of the impulse to resent aggression...
I stumbled on the case in my capacity as an evidence profes-
sor, and found it unremarkable. It is memorable to me, how-
ever, because it introduced me to the Free Law Movement
(Freirechtsschule)5 in German jurisprudence and to the thought of
the man called the Mark Twain of German jurisprudence,6 Ru-
dolf von Jhering.
Jhering came upon a jurisprudential stage cluttered with
the dry abstractions of Kant and Hegel. He swept that stage
clear of mechanical jurisprudence and replaced it with a philoso-
phy centering upon facts, social conditions and day-to-day reali-
ties, a philosophy that captured the United States in the 1930's
and 1940's under the flag of Legal Realism, waved enthusiasti-
cally by Holmes, Pound, Cardozo and Llewelyn. 7
Two of Jhering's ideas are crucial to understanding the
problems besetting the merger of East and West Germany. They
are (a) the centrality of the notion of private property as the
foundation, not only of property rights, but of personal rights as
well; and (b) his notion of rechtsgefiihl, translated clumsily as a
feeling of legal right, but implying the pain and irritation a per-
son feels when he has been put upon.8 It is my thesis that a
fundamental difference between the way these two concepts are
viewed in the former East and West Germanies is a sword in the
bed, presenting a fierce obstacle to the union that both desire.
I. PROPERTY
The fifty-seven men who gathered in the sweltering Phila-
delphia heat of 1787 to draft the United States Constitution were
steeped in the philosophy ofJohn Locke.9 "Whatsoever then, he
removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it
in, he hath mixed his Labor with, and joined it to something that
4. Id.
5. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 7 (1989).
6. WILLIAM SEAGLE, MEN OF LAW 306 (1947).
7. See James E. Herget and Stephen Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as the
Source of American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REv. 399 (1987).
8. See RUDOLF VONJHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW 21-31 (JohnJ. Lalor trans., 2d
ed. 1915) [hereinafterJHERING] (describing life of law as struggle).
9. See Walton H. Hamilton, Property - According to Locke, 41 YALE LJ. 864, 873-75
(1932).
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is his own, and thereby makes it his property."' ° The right of an
individual - and, by extension, a corporation - to own prop-
erty lies at the taproot of democratic political theory.
In The Struggle for Law, Jhering arrived at the same conclu-
sion as Locke, but started his journey even further back. "The
preservation of existence," he wrote, "is the highest law of the
whole living creation."" To achieve this existence the right of
private ownership is essential. With uncanny prescience he ob-
served that "[c]ommunism thrives only in those quagmires in
which the true idea of property is lost."1 2 This dismal prophecy
was fulfilled in East Germany, scarcely a century later. It remains
today one of the most serious impediments to German unifica-
tion.
Although the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht) has proclaimed the "economic neutrality of the Ba-
sic Law," 13 a bedrock premise of German constitutional culture
is the right to own and to dispose of property, both guaranteed
by Article 14 of the German constitution ("Grundgesetz" or "Ba-
sic Law"). 14
The miraculous recovery of West Germany from the ashes
of World War II and the abysmal failure of East Germany that
led to its self-imposed exile behind the Berlin Wall were due in
major part to the acquisition of property and wealth in the for-
mer and the stunted conception of property and wealth in the
latter. As the Durants have reminded us in The Lessons of Histoy,
"[t] he experience of the past leaves little doubt that every eco-
nomic system must sooner or later rely upon some form of the
profit motive to stir individuals and groups to productivity."1
With the factories, plants, and most of the machinery of pro-
duction owned or controlled by the state, East Germany offered
little opportunity and less incentive to create wealth. Employ-
ment was assured, but not in the job of one's choice. East Ger-
many determined where you worked and how much you should
10. JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 306, § 27 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d
ed. 1967).
11. JHERING, supra note 8, at 31.
12. Id. at 53-54.
13. Judgment of July 29, 1954 (Investment Aid Case), BVerfG First Sen., 4 Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 7, 17-18 (1954).
14. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 14 (F.R.G.).
15. WiLL DuRANT & ARIEL DuRANT, THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 54 (5th ed. 1968).
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280 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 17:277
produce. Everyone earned about the same salary (1,000-1,500
marks a month).' 6 The resulting lack of incentive can be seen in
that hapless symbol of the East German economy: the Trabant
car, now just an embarrassing memory.
The stark opposition of the two conceptions has made
melding the East German work force with that of West Germany
far more difficult than was anticipated. Until it is accomplished
there can be little realistic hope of shaping a new legal order
that will wipe out the defacto distinctions that still exist between
the two Germanies.
II. RECHTSGEFUHL
Denouncing the German Historical School and his own
mentors, Savigny and Puchta, Rudolf von Jhering rejected their
notion that the law of a people evolves easily and naturally, the
way a language does. Rather, "[t]he life of the law is a struggle,
- a struggle of nations, of the state power, of classes, of individ-
uals."' 7 (Hence, the title of his masterwork, Der Kampf uns Recht,
translated as The Struggle for Law).
Moving from the general to the particular, Jhering won-
dered what drove people to sue each other. He recognized im-
mediately, as did Savigny and the Roman Law votaries, that pri-
vate law was forged on the anvil of litigation; but what was it that
moved the adversaries to "go to the law" in the first place?",
Jhering concluded that, stripped of all rationalizations, the spark
that ignited litigation was the inner pain, the angst, the rage one
feels when he believes he has been wronged: in his word, almost
untranslatable, rechtsgefiihl.
By demanding his "rights" the incensed citizen sharpens the
conflict, and its resolution adds a new contour to the law. In a
famous passage, Jhering asserts:
Irritability, that is the capacity to feel pain at the violation of
one's legal rights, and action, that is the courage and the de-
termination to repel the attack, are, in my eyes, the two crite-
ria of a healthy feeling of legal right.' 9
16. Thomas Irwin, Bringing Justice to the Wild East: Reconstruction in the Former GDR,
79 A.B.A. J. 58, 60 (Apr. 1993).
17. JHERING, supra note 8, at 1.
18. See id. at 24 (discussing decision to assert one's legal rights after violation).
19. JHERING, supra note 8, at 63.
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, Jhering observed that people were angered by different
slights. Military officers, for example, were notoriously slovenly
about their financial rights and obligations, but were quick to
react to any slight upon their honor. Farmers, on the other
hand, easily shrugged off personal affronts, but rose up instantly
at trespasses to their land. Social and cultural forces, therefore,
affect our conception of rights, and determine which wrongs
should be swallowed and which should be protested. Still, even
if different classes respond to different slights, 20 there must be a
consensus on the core values of all the citizens if a coherent
body politic is to evolve.
The most significant articulation of a people's core values is
a nation's constitution. It is there you will find the major prem-
ises and recurrent aspirations of the nation. In the Basic Law of
Germany lies in plain view a statement of basic principles that
are utterly alien to the Marxist-Leninist cast of the East German
mind.
III. THE BASIC LAW
The Basic Law ("Grundgesetz") of West Germany was
adopted on May 23, 1949.21 The grander term "constitution"
("Verfassung") was rejected since the Basic Law pledged reunifi-
cation, and use of the word "constitution" might have implied a
permanent jurisprudential structure excluding East Germany. 2
A constitution of staggering detail, the Basic Law reflects its
civil law tradition. Its eleven sections and well over one hundred
articles codify much of the federalist structure and individual
rights that our Supreme Court developed through two centuries
of interpretation. Unlike the amorphous Commerce Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, for instance, the Basic Law spells out the
areas in which the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction,
and those areas where it shares regulatory power with the Ldnder
20. Obviously, Jhering had little truck with the admonition of Saint Paul that the
citizens of Corinth should avoid litigation and just turn the other cheek. 1 Corinthians
5:7.
21. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany Announcement by the Parliamentary
Council, FED. L. GAZETTE, May 23, 1949 (stating that Basic Law of Federal Republic of
Germany was adopted by Parliamentary Council on May 23, 1949).
22. Rudolf Dolzer, The Path to German Unity: The Constitutional, Legal and Interna-
tional Framework in SEIES DRAGER FOUNDATION, 14 GERMANY AND ITs BAsic LAw 365, 370
(Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
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(states) .23 And whereas the right to pursue an occupation of
one's choice is protected in the United States by the Due Process
Clause, Article 12 of the Basic Law expressly guarantees this
right.24
The Basic Law wears its jurisprudence on its sleeve. It
proudly proclaims that its core purpose is the establishment of a
"free democratic basic order."25 This "basic order" - a central
notion in modern German jurisprudence dating at least from
Kant - is to be achieved by the sound application of three or-
ganizing principles: Rechtsstaat, Sozialstaat, and Parteienstaat,
(usually translated as, rule of law, social welfare, and political
party state, respectively) .26 Thus, Article 20 declares that "Ger-
many is a democratic and social federal state," and that
"[1]egislation shall be subject to the constitutional order; the ex-
ecutive and judiciary shall be bound by law and justice. '27
Rechtsstaat is a notion familiar to American lawyers. It ap-
pears on the facade of many of our courthouses: A government
of laws, not of men.28 Sozialstaat suffuses Article 14 which de-
clares: "Property and the right of inheritance are guaranteed.
... [but] it imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public
weal." 29 Recognizing the fundamental right to own property, Ar-
ticle 14 also imposes an affirmative obligation on the govern-
ment to ensure that the social well-being of all German citizens is
provided. How this is accomplished is a matter of political pol-
icy, but, reflecting the social thinking of Bismarck, the essential
needs of German citizens (health care, labor rights, etc.) must
always be met.
Quite obviously, the Basic Law marches to a different drum-
mer than the U.S. Constitution. Though the United States is
also a democracy based on the rule of law, neither the U.S. Con-
stitution nor its constitutional tradition conceives of objective or-
ganizing principles that animate social and governmental rela-
tions. The difference is starkly apparent in the absence of the
23. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] arts. 73-74 (F.R.G.).
24. Id. art. 12.
25. Id. art. 21.
26. KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 40.
27. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 21 (F.R.G.).
28. See KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 42-43 (explaining historical and contemporary
meaning of Rechsstaat).
29. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 20 (F.1.G.).
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Sozialstaat principle in the U.S. Constitution. An American prop-
erty owner has no obligation other than to ensure that he does
not interfere with the rights of others as he enjoys his property.
Similarly, the notion of government as a social welfare state with
affirmative obligations to provide for the basic needs of its citi-
zens is a comparatively recent notion in the United States. More
importantly, it derives from political, not constitutional sources,
and certainly not from enumerated or objective constitutional
principles.
In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court has an inte-
gral role in the essentially political process of allocating social
benefits. ° In the United States, on the other hand, the
Supreme Court has made clear that we are not a social welfare
state, except to the extent that we choose to be. Individuals are
not entitled as of right to social assistance, nor is the government
obligated to provide it. As Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
wrote in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services,"
&tour cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses gener-
ally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where
such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property in-
terests of which the government itself may not deprive the indi-
vidual." 2
Whereas political parties in the United States evolved by
and large by chance, the doctrine of Parteienstaat weaves them
into the fabric of German democracy. The Federal Constitu-
tional Court has thus often recognized political parties as "con-
stitutional organs."3 3
The Basic Law thus guarantees the free establishment of
political parties for, as mandated by Article 21, they are "to par-
ticipate in the forming of the political will of the people."34
There are however, important limits to this freedom. All parties
must be organized on democratic principles,35 and parties that
"seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order" or
endanger its existence may be declared unconstitutional by the
30. KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 41-42.
31. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
32. Id. at 196.
33. KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 202 (citing cases).
34. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 21 (F.R.G.); KOMMERS, supra note 5, at
40-41.
35. GRUNDGESETrZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 21 (1) (F.R.G.).
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Federal Constitutional Court.36 The power to declare a political
party unconstitutional (the Court has done so twice in its his-
tory) 37 is a unique feature of the Basic Law.
The series of provisions of the Basic Law, including the
power to declare political parties unconstitutional, which serve
as the ultimate safeguard of the Basic Law and the "free demo-
cratic basic order" constitute Streitbare Demokratie (militant de-
mocracy) .38 Accordingly, Article 79 provides that amendments
seeking to impair the federalist nature of Germany, or the fun-
damental rights enumerated in Articles 1 and 20, "shall be inad-
missible."39 Similarly, Article 19 provides that "[i] n no case may
the essential content of a basic right be encroached upon."4"
The Federal Constitutional Court thus has the authority to de-
clare even amendments to the constitution unconstitutional. In
addition, the Basic Law provides for the forfeiture of individual
rights by those who use their guaranteed freedom to combat the
"free democratic basic order," and trumpets that "[a] 11 Germans
shall have the right to resist any person or persons seeking to
abolish that constitutional order, should no other remedy be
possible."41
The concept of a militant democracy is alien to Americans.
Like the Sozialstaat principle, it places affirmative obligations on
German citizens to defend the objective democratic order. The
benefit of a free democratic order, therefore, also means pro-
tecting that order by refraining from activity contrary to it, and
coming to its defense, if necessary. Thus, freedom of association
is limited in the same manner as are political parties: "Associa-
tions, the purposes or activities of which.., are directed against
the constitutional order .. .are prohibited."4" Furthermore,
civil servants and employees of the government are required by
federal law to "manifest by [their] entire behavior [their] support
for the free democratic basic order within the spirit of the Basic
36. Id. art. 21(2).
37. Judgment of Oct. 23, 1952 (Socialist Reich Party Case), BVerfG First Sen., 2
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (1952);Judgment of Aug.
17, 1956 (Communist Party Case), BVerfG First Sen., 5 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 85 (1956).
38. KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 43-44.
39. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 79(3) (F.R.G.).
40. Id. art. 19(2).
41. Id. art. 20(4).
42. Id. art. 9(2) (inserted by Federal Law of 24 June 1968).
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Law. " 4 3
The U.S. Constitution does not contain any similar provi-
sions. Instead, it relies wholly on the political process to define
the limits of constitutional tolerance. Rather than setting indi-
vidual limits on the freedom of political or even anti-democratic
action, the U.S. Supreme Court defines the limits of government
and individual action that can be taken against such activity.
The Constitution addresses anti-democratic activity only in a
negative sense by protecting freedom of speech, the press, as-
sembly and association. But it imposes no affirmative obligation
on its citizens to promote these values.
IV. ROLE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
The Federal Constitutional Court ("FCC") bears a surface
similarity to the U.S. Supreme Court in that it is the final inter-
preter of the Basic Law. "Final" is slightly misleading. "Only"
would be more accurate. No other German court, high or low, is
competent to pass on a constitutional question and, should such
a question arise in the course of litigation, the action must be
stayed while the constitutional question is certified to the FCC.
As one German law professor remarked, "[t] he Basic Law is
now virtually identical with its interpretation by the Federal Con-
stitutional Court."44 At the risk of sounding jingoistic, I think
our own ChiefJustice Charles Evan Hughes said it better: "[t] he
Constitution is what the judges say it is."4" The FCC conducts, in
effect, an on-going school of constitutional law. Only loosely
constrained by doctrines familiar to American lawyers - stand-
ing, ripeness, mootness - it does not require a case or contro-
versy to galvanize it. It issues "Abstract Judicial" opinions in re-
sponse to official inquiries about the constitutionality of ques-
tionable statutes. 46  "In practice, this extensive jurisdiction
means that any constitutional matter may be brought before the
Court in any form."47 The President of the Court recently com-
plained that many German citizens "go to court for every last
43. KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 237.
44. KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 63 (quoting speech of Professor Rudolf Smend on
tenth anniversary of German Constitutional Court [BverfG]).
45. CHARLES EvANs HUGHES, ADDRESSES AND PAPERS 139 (1908).
46. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] art. 93(1) and (2) (F.R.G.); KOMMERS, supra note
5, at 15.
47. Klaus Stern, General Assessment of the Basic Law - A German View in SERIES
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state benefit to which they believe they are entitled... 48 Ru-
dolf von Jhering would applaud them.
As should be obvious, and was intended, the expansive juris-
diction of the FCC enables the Court to participate heartily in
Germany's political system. Although the FCC is not a court of
general jurisdiction and, with few exceptions, can only decide
constitutional issues, it resolves federalism questions between the
federal government and the Ldnder. It also entertains Organstreit
proceedings which involve constitutional disputes between the
"highest organs of the Federal Republic." 49 The FCC thereby
takes a vigorous role in resolving the disputes between the fed-
eral government and the Ldnder and in adjusting the balance
between the federal organs.
The FCC is not, however, a court of general review. There
are five "Supreme" Courts to make definitive rulings on all ques-
tions of law other than constitutional questions.5" The FCC
therefore does not address questions of fact or law unless so
clearly wrong as to amount to a violation of the Basic Law. When
presented with a constitutional question, however, it is obligated
to decide it.5 When declaring legislation unconstitutional, it
may do so in two ways. Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the FCC
may declare the provision null and void (Nichtig).52 It also has
the option, however, of declaring the provision incompatible
(Unvereinbar) with the Basic Law, but leaving that statute in ef-
fect until Parliament corrects the defect.5 3 Strictly speaking, this
means it has been upheld, yet the declaration comes with de-
tailed advice describing its deficiency and how Parliament
should amend it.
Plainly, the FCC takes a much more active role in the nuts
and bolts of daily government than does the U.S. Supreme
Court. Because it directly influences the balance of political
power and legislation, the FCC is deeply involved in adjusting
DRAGER FOUNDATION, 14 GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAw 17, 22 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P.
Kommers eds., 1993).
48. Roman Herzog, The Separation and Concentration of Power in the Basic Law in
SERIES DRAGER FOUNDATION, 14 GERMANY AND ITS BASic LAw 391, 401 (Paul Kirchhof &
Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
49. KOMMERS, supra note 5, at 13.
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id. at 14.
52. Id. at 15.
53. Id.
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political and social reality to achieve the constitutional order of
the Basic Law.
In contrast, while the U.S. Supreme Court remains the ulti-
mate safeguard of individual rights, its guiding principles in the
U.S. Constitution dictate that it remain completely above the
political fray. Its separation of powers cases are a means of en-
suring its separateness, not of adjusting the relative positions of
the coordinate branches.
V. PROBLEMS AFTER REUNIFICATION
On October 3, 1990, sixteen million East Germans became
part of an unified Germany. They arrived with cultural baggage
markedly setting them apart from their brethren in the West.
Forty-five years of Communist domination has produced two
generations of Germans who simply do not think the same way
as their brothers and sisters in the West. This dysfunction will
probably take another generation to rectify.
Popular German slang divides all Germany, like ancient
Gaul, into three parts: Wessis (Western Germans), Ossis (Eastern
Germans) and Wossis (Westerners who have recently moved east
for capitalist ventures)." This cleavage reflects the cultural
chasm that has developed in the past fifty years between the West
Germans - individualists fueled by the profit motive but with a
social conscience - and East Germans - conformists with guar-
anteed jobs and little incentive to improve their lot in life. As
Jhering might say, the German Law cannot continue to be wood-
enly applied to all German citizens when there are two distinct
peoples marching to different juridical drummers. Heinrich
Lehmann-Grube, a Wossi who headed east when The Wall fell
and is now Mayor of Leipzig, spoke of the problem in a recent
interview:
We didn't realize it at the time, but the difference be-
tween East and West Germany was far greater than the differ-
ence between, say, West Germany and England or West Ger-
many and Italy .... Imagine if, overnight, the United States
had to adopt the Chinese or Japanese system of politics, laws
and customs. It means that everything changes completely,
and it leads to tremendous disorientation and fear. Many
people here are carrying very heavy psychological burdens.
54. Irwin, supra note 16, at 60.
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This is going to be part of life here for at least a generation.
55
West Germany has struck a workable balance between mar-
ket and welfare economies. The state regulates and even subsi-
dizes vital economic sectors, but it also provides a social safety
net. Job security and social assistance are accepted as obligations
of the German government. But expectation is tempered by the
limited nature of the benefits and the realities of a market-driven
economy. Market forces drive production. Quality and supply
of goods influence demand. Labor thus has an important stake
in the life of the enterprise.
West Germany has absorbed at least eighteen million peo-
ple (approximately one-quarter of the present population)' since
1989. Many of them are impoverished. Their expectations nec-
essarily exceed the ability of Germany to satisfy them. Evidence
of the clash of values between the Wessis and the Ossis is every-
where. Eastern Europeans unable to find work have turned to
the government for assistance. Citizens of the former West Ger-
many have responded, both politically and socially, with increas-
ing vehemence (and violence), as escalating costs have reached
nearly half of the government budget.
The common values and cultural assumptions on which the
objective order of the Basic Law was based' are evaporating. In-
dustrial workers in West Germany for example, have grown ac-
customed to thirty paid vacation days a year - six weeks - and
to an extra month's salary at Christmas. Health insurance, pen-
sions, and unemployment contributions add 19.4% of each em-
ployee's pay to payroll costs.5 6 To absorb the rickety East Ger-
man industrial economy and accord the workers the same bene-
fits poses a colossal economic obstacle. 57 Even Chancellor
Helmut Kohl, who in a burst of exuberance, declared at the time
of unification that East Germany would soon become a "bloom-
ing landscape," conceded just last month that he had underesti-
mated the ability of a united Germany to finance the merger.58
Demographics do not bode well either. Each German wo-
man of childbearing age, for example, is statistically expected to
55. Stephen Kinzer, Apolda Journal" When Laissez-Faire Collides with Just Plain Lazy,
N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1993, at A4.
56. Craig R. Whitney, Western Europe's Dreams Turning to Nightmares, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 1993, at Al.
57. Id.
58. See Kinzer, supra note 55, at A4.
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have 1.5 children between 1990 and 1995."9 This is almost the
lowest in the world. (In Rwanda, 8.5 children are predicted. In
Italy, the lowest, 1.3 are projected.) Although "a high birth rate
... usually accompanie[s] a culturally low civilization, and a low
birth rate a civilization culturally high,"' the cruel fact remains
that it will not be long before the retirees, who now enjoy longer
lives, will outnumber the productive workers and the demands
of the sozialstaat will collide with the inexorably grinding laws of
supply and demand. Chancellor Kohl himself has recently ac-
knowledged the problem.6
Communist economic policy deliberately ignored market
influence for the sake of full employment. Communist worker
expectation bore little resemblance to market reality. Because
all the i means of production were under state control, quantity
and quality of production were of little consequence. Produc-
tion levels were set largely without regard to product suitability,
desirability or demand. Workers were employed regardless of
their efficiency or the overall efficiency of the enterprise. If
product demand is ignored, and if state production levels are
enforced without regard to product quality, worker incentive is
diminished. When this is compounded by guaranteed employ-
ment, you have a prescription for institutional complacence.
While I believe the economic problems caused by reunifica-
tion are the single most vexing obstacle, there are other funda-
mental differences between East and West suggesting that the
people do not share a common weltanschauung, or world view.
For example, in a recent international survey of religious beliefs,
nineteen thousand people in twelve countries were asked
whether they believed in God. Sixty-seven percent of West
Germans and only twenty-six percent of East Germans said yes.62
This can translate into practical difficulties.
In East Germany, abortion has long been available on de-
mand. In West Germany, although the Basic Law is silent, the
FCC, as early as 197563 and as recently as this May has held that
59. Alan Cowell, Low Birthrate Is Becoming a Headache for Italy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
1993, at Al, A5 (reporting United Nations Population Fund study).
60. DuRANT, supra note 15, at 21.
61. Kohl Lauds Work Ethic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1993, § 1, at 44.
62. Religious Beliefs Internationaly, THE TABLET, June 5, 1993, at 2.
63. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfG First Sen., 39 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (1975).'
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because it is fundamentally wrongful (Unrecht), abortion is avail-
able only for medical or eugenic reasons or in circumstances of
extreme social hardship.64 With two such different mind-sets, it
is not unlikely that Germany will eventually be wracked, as has
been the United States since Roe v. Wade. 5
In East Germany, divorce was available upon demand. A
spouse had only to show that the union "had lost its meaning for
socialism."66 In an Orwellian twist, however, because of the lack
of housing in the East, the parties usually had to continue to live
together while they sought the divorce. West German law re-
quires a year of physical separation before a divorce. Someone is
going to have to give.
Child support following a divorce was routine in East Ger-
many. Since most workers earned the same salary the judge
could easily order that the support be docked from his salary
and turned over to the mother. In West Germany the process of
getting child support mimics the American system of catch-as-
catch-can. To many Ossi mothers the ancien regime was utopian
"with full employment, equal wages and no possibility of leaving
the country[,] [d]addy couldn't lose his job and he couldn't run
away. And Big Brother made sure that he paid it."67
If order is to be restored, a new balance must be struck; a
new objective order must be conceived. If the FCC is to meet
these challenges, it must respond to them through each of its
jurisdictional channels.
Initially, it must restrain the conservative will of the majority
when challenged in Organstreit and abstract judicial review cases.
On the other hand, as the political voice of the minority grows
and challenges majority legislation, the minority will have to be
reigned in. More prosperous Ldnder can be expected to chal-
lenge their mushrooming obligations to the poorer Ldnder in
the equal distribution scheme. And private citizens will doubt-
less challenge more federal and state laws through the constitu-
tional complaint procedure.
That the FCC will prove equal to this occasion is evident
64. Judgment of May 28, 1993 (2 BvF 2/90, 2 BvF 4/92, 2 BvF BvF 5/92), BVerfG
Second Sen. (unpublished slip opinion) (unofficial translation on file with Fordham In-
ternational Law Journal).
65. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
66. Irwin, supra note 16, at 60.
67. Id.
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from how it handled Germany's recent amendment to the asy-
lum provision of the Basic Law.68 Responding to the certain
constitutional challenge, the FCC held that the unlimited right
to remain in Germany during years of immigration appeal im-
permissibly interfered with Germans' right to self-determination.
The limiting amendment was therefore constitutional in light of
the objectives of the Basic Law as a whole.
In thus restricting immigration, the FCC decision reflects
the conservative alarm. At the same time, however, the FCC has
affirmatively acted to ensure that review procedures are safe-
guarded. The FCC has found a palatable middle ground. While
conservatives have argued that the new policies are not strict
enough, liberals have argued that the amendment has infringed
too greatly on a fundamental provision of the Basic Law. That
the decisions have been attacked by both camps is probably a
portent that the FCC found the via media.
The FCC has also displayed its jurisprudential maturity in
the handling of the constitutional challenge to Germany's ratifi-
cation of the Treaty on European Union, popularly known as
the Maastricht Treaty. Not surprisingly, the genuine European
unity envisioned by the European Community ("EC"), carries in
its wake a diminution of German sovereignty, just as the creation
of the United States diluted the sovereignty of the individual
states two hundred years ago in our country.
When the inevitable constitutional challenge to the German
government's ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was mounted,
the FCC was able to strike a balance between encouraging
greater European unity while still safeguarding German individ-
ual rights. 9 Happily, the Basic Law specifically provides for the
cession of federal power to a supranational authority like the
EC.7 ° The FCC, therefore, was once again able to find a middle
68. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 16(a) (amending art. 16, effectiveJuly 1,
1993). The amendment and accompanying legislation essentially create a presumption
against the existence of political persecution of Eastern European immigrants seeking
to enter Germany.
69. See Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993 (2BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92), BVerfG Sec-
ond Sen. (unpublished slip opinion) (unofficial translation on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
70. See GRUNDGSETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 24(1). Although this provision of the
Basic Law was enacted to address the cession of sovereign authority required for West
Germany to join both the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
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ground to reconcile the demands of both the Basic Law7 and
the Maastricht Treaty.7 2 The FCC upheld the government's rati-
fication of the Treaty, but specifically tied progress toward Euro-
pean unity to tie increased democratic legitimation of the EC
legislative processes, each envisioned by the Maastricht Treaty.
The FCC solution approaches the Solomonic.
CONCLUSION
The FCC faces its greatest challenge since its establishment.
German unification presents a serious and unanticipated threat
to the political and social order under which West Germany has
thrived. With the former East Germans and Eastern Europeans
comes a set of expectations based on what we would regard as
distorted notions of a social welfare state. The existence of a
significant and growing number of people who envision a differ-
ent balance between the right to social welfare and economic
liberty upsets the delicate balance of the objective constitutional
order maintained by the FCC.
If the new, larger Germany is to take its rightful place in the
world community, the FCC, as the only organ competent to de-
fine and adjust the objective order of the Basic Law, must accom-
modate the rapidly changing economic, political and social im-
plications of the influx. It must also respond to the increasingly
conservative direction of what was - until recently - the settled
order of West Germany. In short, the objective order conceived
in 1949 by the Basic Law and thereafter articulated by the FCC,
must reflect a new reality that now bears little resemblance to the
reality of the FCC's first four decades.
I can think of no more suitable peroration than to repeat
Jhering's plea for rechtsgefiihl. Though written a century ago it
has particular resonance in this Age of Unification:
For the state which desires to be respected abroad, and
to be firm and unshaken internally, there is no more precious
good which it has to guard and foster than the national feel-
ing of legal right. The fostering of it is one of the highest and
it has been interpreted more broadly to include the greater cession of sovereignty nec-
essary for Germany's inclusion in the European Community.
71. The FCC reads article 20(1) of the Basic Law in conjunction with article 79(3),
declaring the democratic basis of Germany to be inviolable.
72. Treaty on European Union, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247
(1992).
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most important duties of political pedagogy. In the healthy,
vigorous feeling of legal right of the individual, the state pos-
sesses the most fruitful source of its own strength, the surest
guaranty, from within and from without, of its own existence.
The feeling of legal right is the root of the whole tree.73
73. JHERING, supra note 8, at 103.
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